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Rule 15C2-12: A Flawed Regulatory Framework
Creates Pitfalls For Municipal Issuers
Lisa M. Fairchild*
Nan S. Ellis**
Twenty-five years ago, the municipal bond1 market received little
attention. At that time, the majority of municipal bonds were general
obligation bonds,2 and the predominant participants in the market
were banks, underwriters and bond counsel.3 Since 1975, there have
been substantial changes in this market. Municipal bonds have
become increasingly important as sources of funding for industrial
development purposes and essential services such as schools, sewers,
and roads.4 By 1995, the municipal bond market consisted of over 1.5
million distinct issues, valued in excess of $1.2 million,5 and sold by
more than 50,000 different state and local government entities. The
* Associate Professor of Finance, Loyola College in Maryland.
** Associate Professor of Law, Loyola College in Maryland.
1. The terms “municipal bond” and “municipal security” refer to the debt obligations of
states, municipalities, counties and school districts. Ann Judith Gellis, Municipal Securities
Market: Same Problems— No Solutions, 21 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 427, 428 n.1 (1996).
2. See SEC STAFF REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET at 2 (Sept. 1993)
[hereinafter 1993 STAFF REPORT].
3. See id. at 1.
4. See Gellis, supra note 1, at 431 n.9 (discussing the shift from general obligation bonds
to revenue bonds). See also 1993 STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-5. The Report distinguishes
between general obligation and revenue bonds as follows:
The types of securities municipalities generally issue include general obligation bonds,
revenue bonds, and conduit bonds. General obligation bonds are secured by the full
faith and credit and general taxing power of the issuer. A holder of a general obligation
bond may look for repayment to all sources of revenue that the municipality is entitled
to receive. Revenue bonds, on the other hand, are typically issued to support a
particular project, and are paid for out of revenues from that project. ‘Conduit’ bonds,
such as industrial development bonds, are securities issued to finance a project that is
to be used in the trade or business of a private corporation. Typically, investors must
look solely to the credit of the private entity for payment of interest and principal.
Id. at 3.
5. See Gellis, supra note 1, at 431 n.9.
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bonds issued are also becoming more complex due to the increased
use of derivative features.6 Moreover, there is a growing secondary
market in municipal bonds, which was unheard of in earlier periods.
Despite the increasing growth and complexity of the municipal
bond market, it remains subject to minimal regulation. State
regulation is non-uniform, and industry customs require only
voluntary disclosure. Although municipal issuers are subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, they are exempt from the registration and
disclosure requirements of the Acts. SEC Rule 15c2-12 and its
amendments impose an initial disclosure requirement, periodic
disclosure and secondary market reporting. The regulatory
framework provided by Rule 15c2-12, however, is insufficient for
both issuers and investors.7
This article examines the disclosure requirements that issuers face
in today’s municipal bond market. Previous attention has focused on
the failure of Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments to protect investors,
due to its inherent inadequacies.8 This article explores the
implications for issuers of the inadequacy of this regulation. The
article argues that the existing system of state, federal and voluntary
regulation is inadequate and creates numerous pitfalls for issuers—
specifically, that the non-specificity weaknesses of Rule 15c2-12
impose burdens that issuers must overcome. First, this article outlines
the regulatory environment of the municipal bond market, and
highlights gaps in regulation. Second, this article addresses how
disclosure is beneficial to issuers. Third, this article addresses how
the inadequate disclosure scheme dictated by Rule 15c2-12 affects
issuers. Finally, this article recommends that the bifurcated nature of
security regulation, with one scheme imposed on issuers of corporate
securities and another imposed on municipal issuers, be abandoned.
6. Examples of derivatives incorporated into municipal bonds include strips, detachable
calls, inverse floating rate bonds, and embedded swaps. See 1993 STAFF REPORT, supra note 2,
at 1.
7. The inadequacies of Rule 15c2-12 for investors have been the subject of most prior
research in municipal securities regulation. See generally Lisa M. Fairchild & Nan S. Ellis,
Municipal Bond Disclosure: Remaining Inadequacies of Mandatory Disclosure Under Rule
15c2-12, 23 J. CORP. L. 440 (1998); Gellis, supra note 1.
8. See Fairchild & Ellis, supra note 7; Gellis, supra note 1.
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The conclusion of this article is that the SEC should be given power
to regulate municipal securities in a way that mirrors corporate
security regulation.
I. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:
MUNICIPAL DISCLOSURE PRACTICES
The difficulties imposed on issuers by the patchwork system of
regulation that governs municipal bond issues can, perhaps, best be
illustrated by examining the regulatory guidelines that a hypothetical
issuer faces. Assume that a hypothetical municipality, Springfield,
AnyState, wants to raise money to build a hospital. Springfield will
look to industry custom and relevant state and federal law to guide its
disclosure for the issue.
A. Industry Custom
Municipal market participants have voluntarily adopted disclosure
standards.9 For example, the Government Finance Officers
Association10 (GFOA) publishes guidelines for official statements,
which are the primary marketing documents in a municipal
offering.11 These guidelines prescribe both the content and timing of
9. The fiscal problems of New York City, New York State and other major municipal
issuers prompted investor demands for more information about the financial health of issuers.
In 1975, in response to investor demand and concern regarding the possible imposition of
federal disclosure requirements, municipal market participants developed their own disclosure
standards.
10. Initially known as the Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA) the
organization became the Government Finance Officers Association after development of the
disclosure guidelines. William J. Kiernan, Jr., Disclosure Responsibilities in Municipal
Securities Offerings— Some Problems Under SEC Rule 15c2-12, 20 STETSON L. REV. 704 n.21
(1991).
11. See Government Finance Officers Association, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR
OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1991) [hereinafter GFOA
Guidelines]. All citations are to the 1991 revision. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking board
(MSRB) defines the official statement as the “document prepared by the issuer or its
representative setting forth, among other matters, information concerning the issuer and the
proposed issue of securities.” MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING BOARD MANUAL (CCH)
¶ 3656 (1995) [hereinafter MSRB Manual]. The official statement is analogous to the
prospectus distributed prior to corporate issuances and contains all information “material” to the
bond issue. The document usually includes the following: a description of the issuer, the
purpose of the project being financed, a description of the security for the bond, any feasibility
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official statements.12 The suggested content includes financial report
information, revenue information, debt information, and
demographic, economic and governmental information.
Our hypothetical city of Springfield might voluntarily comply
with the GFOA disclosure guidelines in preparing and distributing an
official statement. If so, it will prepare an official statement following
the content and form prescribed by the GFOA and furnish an official
statement to all investors. It should be re-emphasized, however, that
such compliance is voluntary. Furthermore, the GFOA disclosure
guidelines are considerably less comprehensive than the SEC
disclosure requirements for corporate issuers.13 Compliance only with
GFOA guidelines will, therefore, create a disparity between the
information available to municipal bond investors and that available
to investors in corporate securities.
B. Blue Sky Laws
Springfield will also examine state law to ascertain the applicable
disclosure requirements and will discover that municipal disclosure
requirements vary substantially under state blue sky laws.14 At one
extreme are the full disclosure states, which require formal
registration of all municipal issues, approval by a central repository
prior to issuance, and adherence to strict guidelines for the type of
information provided in the official statement.15 In a full disclosure
studies of the underlying project that are relevant to the issue, any contracts or obligations of the
municipality that are either related to the issue or that might affect the issue; and a summary of
the principal financing documents.
12. See Kiernan, supra note 10, at 701, 704.
13. See 1993 STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix C, at 1. See also Fairchild & Ellis,
supra note 7 (highlighting differences between GFOA and SEC disclosure requirements).
14. The differences likely exist for several reasons. First, nondisclosure states may have
little default experience. Second, state officials in nondisclosure states may assume that rating
agencies provide a sufficient type of disclosure. This, of course, does not explain why
disclosure is not required for nonrated bonds. Third, nondisclosure states are typically small,
rural states with relatively low volume of municipal securities issues. See Lisa M. Fairchild &
Timothy W. Koch, The Impact of State Disclosure Requirements on Municipal Yields 51 NAT.
TAX J. 733 (1998).
15. There are 14 full disclosure states which require the filing of official statements and
approval by state regulators for all types of tax-exempt debt issued within the state. The full
disclosure states are Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas. See infra
Washington University Open Scholarship
226.doc 08/24/00
2000] Pitfalls for Municipal Issuers 591
state, Springfield must file the official statement and obtain approval
from state regulators prior to issuance. Information provided in
official statements in full disclosure states is relatively homogeneous
because these official statements must meet GFOA guidelines.16 The
filing process, however, varies across states.17
At the other extreme are nondisclosure states, which exempt all
issues from registration and disclosure requirements.18 Nondisclosure
states do not require official statements or state regulatory approval
for any type of tax-exempt debt issued within the state, and adherence
to industry guidelines is strictly voluntary. Therefore, official
statements vary greatly in these states.19 Thus, if Springfield offers
securities for sale in a non-disclosure state, the state imposes no
requirements. Springfield could either elect to prepare an official
statement meeting GFOA guidelines, use a document of its choosing,
or forgo preparation of an official statement.20
The remaining states, which fall between the two extremes,
subject only a small subset of issues to mandatory disclosure.21 In
note 21.
16. See Fairchild & Koch, supra note 14, at 736, 737.
17. In some states, more than one state regulatory agency scrutinizes the official
statement. In Texas, for example, the official statements for all types of debt are filed with and
approved by the Comptroller of Public Accounts. Depending on whether the issue is a general
obligation or a revenue issue, either the Texas State Treasurer or the State Auditor and
Inspector must then approve the official statement. See Fairchild & Koch, supra note 14, at 737.
In other states, such as Tennessee, only the State Controller approves the official statements.
See id.
18. There are 15 nondisclosure states which have no statutory provisions for the filing of
official statements or approval by state authorities. The nondisclosure states are Alabama,
Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Wyoming has statutory
disclosure requirements, but does not collect any information from issuers. See infra note 21. In
these states, although issuers typically provide official statements, the statements are frequently
not available until after investors have purchased the bonds.
19. The lack of regulation requiring registration and approval of official statements prior
to issuance may impair investors' ability to accurately assess default risk. See infra notes 78-85
and accompanying text discussing the implications for issuers of such inability.
20. Rule 15c2-12, discussed infra Part II.B, requires that Springfield use an official
statement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b) (1997).
21. According to a 1990 survey conducted by the National Association of State Auditors,
Comptrollers, and Treasurers (NASACT), there are 21 partial disclosure states. Detailed survey
results are reported in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE AUDITORS, COMPTROLLERS, AND
TREASURERS, THE MUNICIPAL DISCLOSURE TASK FORCE REPORT (1990). The partial
disclosure states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
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general, the type of bond (revenue or general obligation) and the type
of issuer (local, state, or agency) determine whether regulators
demand an official statement. When official statements are required,
the contents must be similar to those outlined by the GFOA. For
issuers not subject to official statement disclosure requirements,
adherence to the GFOA guidelines is voluntary.
Thus, the extent to which blue sky laws dictate Springfield’s
behavior is determined entirely by the state in which Springfield
issues the bonds. Because this patchwork system of state regulation
is, by and large, inadequate, the extent to which federal regulation
provides uniform disclosure regulations to fill in the gaps in state
regulation must be considered.
C. Federal Regulation
1. Federal Statutes
Municipal securities are exempt from the disclosure regulations of
both the Securities Act of 193322 (“the ‘33 Act”) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“the ‘34 Act”).23 Municipal securities,
however, are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the ‘33 Act.24
Specifically, Sections 17(a)25 and 10b26 of the ‘33 Act apply to
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
22. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
23. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1994).
24. The 1933 Act includes local governments in its definition of “person.” Securities Act
of 1933 § 2(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1994).
25. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1988). Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. . . .
In Thiele v. Shields, the court held that § 17(a) is applicable to municipal bonds. See 131 F.
Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). There is, however, no private cause of action for Section
17(a). See, e.g., In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 623 F.
Supp. 1466, 1476-80 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
26. While courts did not originally apply 10(b) to state and local governments, see, e.g.,
Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1280 (D. Kan.
1980), the Securities Reform Act of 1975 added “government, or political subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of a government” to the definition of “person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(9) (1994).
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fraudulent statements made in connection with the purchase and sale
of municipal securities.27 Under federal securities laws, Springfield
will not have to comply with the detailed disclosure requirements
applicable to corporate securities,28 nor face the almost absolute
liability imposed for misstatements in corporate security offerings;29
it must only avoid fraudulent misstatements.30
2. MSRB Rules
In addition to the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act, Springfield must
conform to a number of rules promulgated to govern municipal issuer
behavior. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) has
primary rulemaking authority for the municipal bond market.31 The
MSRB has promulgated rules designed to standardize municipal
Importantly, Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to Section 10b, is applicable to municipal
bonds. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). See, e.g., In re Washington Public Power Supply System
Securities Litigation, 623 F. Supp. 1466, 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1985); Ann Judith Gellis,
Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: Issues in Implementation, 13 J. CORP. L. 65,
69-70 (1987); Marc I. Steinberg, Municipal Issuer Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws,
6 J. CORP. L. 277, 279-80 (1981). But see Margaret V. Sachs, Are Local Governments Liable
Under Rule 10b-5? Textualism and Its Limits, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 56 (1992) (“Local
governments are immune from liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5”).
27. The anti-fraud prohibitions have been ineffective in regulating municipal issuer
disclosure. In spite of the anti-fraud prohibitions, there was virtually no disclosure prior to Rule
15c2-12. See, e.g., John E. Petersen et al., Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the Municipal
Securities Market, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1186-97 (1976). Studies reveal that during this period,
investors relied almost exclusively on the rating agencies. Gellis, supra note 26, at 71. Investors
brought few lawsuits against municipal issuers and/or underwriters alleging violations of either
section 17(a) or Rule 10b-5. Robert W. Doty & John E. Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws
and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 373-77 (1976). A
spokesperson for the MSRB noted in his testimony on proposed regulation that it was “clear
that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws provide inadequate guidance to
market participants as to their obligations and potential liabilities in bringing municipal
securities to market and therefore do not serve to further the protection of investors.” See Gellis,
supra note 26, at 72 n.31 (citing Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1976: Hearings on
S. 2574 and S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. On Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 253 (1977)).
28. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77C(a)(2) (1994). See infra notes
147-54 and accompanying text (contrasting municipal bond disclosure with that of corporate
securities).
29. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77K(a) (1994).
31. The MSRB was established by The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1994)).
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securities trading practices,32 including the following: rules
applicable to books and records,33 rules applicable to confirmation,
clearance and settlement procedures34 and rules governing
standardized price and commission practices.35 Some rules of the
MSRB specifically pertain to disclosure practices. For example,
MSRB rules require dealers to provide their customers with copies of
official statements that the issuer has voluntarily supplied,36 and
require underwriters to provide the MSRB with copies of these
official statements.37 Furthermore, under the “suitability rule,”
dealers must have “reasonable grounds” to believe that the securities
they market are suitable for investors.38
The applicability of MSRB rules to issuers, however, is
problematic. Securities regulations prohibit the MSRB from imposing
pre-issuance filing requirements on municipal issuers.39 In other
words, the MSRB cannot require an issuer to register or provide
disclosure documents to either the MSRB or to the SEC prior to
marketing securities.40 Moreover, the Tower Amendment to the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 prohibits the MSRB from
requiring that brokers and dealers furnish documents related to an
issuer.41 Thus, regulation by MSRB rule is indirect. Voluntary
32. See Gellis, supra note 1, at 434.
33. MSRB Manual, supra note 11, at ¶ 3536.
34. See id. at ¶ 3571.
35. See id. at ¶ 3581.
36. See id. at ¶ 3656.
37. See id. at ¶ 3676. The goal is for the MSRB to collect the official statements for its
primary market repository. See PUBLIC SEC. ASS’N, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
165-166 (1990).
38. Dealers must found their belief upon a “reasonable investigation.” MSRB Manual,
supra note 11, ¶ 3591.
39. Section 78o-4(d)(1) provides:
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this chapter, by rule or
regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a
purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the
Commission or the Board prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any
application report, or document in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of
such securities.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (1994).
40. See id.
41. Section 78o-4(d)(2) provides:
(2) The Board is not authorized under this chapter to require any issuer of municipal
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compliance with these rules, however, has been slowly changing the
nature of the municipal securities market.42
3. SEC Rule 15c2-12
In addition to the foregoing requirements, Springfield must
comply with SEC Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments, which govern
municipal bond disclosure.43 Designed in response to the near-
defaults of New York City and Orange County and the Washington
Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) scandal,44 the Rule45 requires
limited dissemination of information by underwriters in municipal
securities offerings through the use of Nationally Recognized
Municipal Securities Information Repositories (NRMSIRs), rather
than SEC filings by issuers.46 Specifically, Rule 15c2-12 imposes
four duties on the Participating Underwriter47 in a municipal
securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal securities broker or municipal
securities dealer or otherwise, to furnish to the Board or to a purchaser or a prospective
purchaser of such securities any application, report, document, or information with
respect to such issuer: Provided, however, That the Board may require municipal
securities brokers and municipal securities dealers to furnish to the Board or
purchasers or prospective purchasers of municipal securities applications, reports,
documents, and information with respect to the issuer thereof which is generally
available from a source other than such issuer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed to impair or limit the power of the Commission under any provision of the
chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2) (1994).
42. By 1988, for example, estimates show that official statements were prepared for 84%
of municipal bond offerings. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778, 37,784
n.45 (Sept. 28, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Release].
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (1997).
44. For a discussion of the WPPSS default, see generally Joel Seligman, The Washington
Public Power Supply System Debacle, 14 J. CORP. L. 889 (1989) (discussing implications of
reform).
45. For a detailed discussion of the rule and its impact, see generally 2 M. DAVID
GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 8:10 (1995). See also Robert
A. Fippinger & Edward L. Pittman, Disclosure Obligations of Underwriters of Municipal
Securities, 47 BUS. LAW. 127 (1991); David S. Goodman, New SEC Municipal Bond
Disclosure Rule, 10 MUN. FIN. J. 281 (1990); Kiernan, supra note 10.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15C2-12(B)(4) (1995). In contrast to the registration requirements for
corporate securities, the Rule uses the NRMSIRs to provide investors with information rather
than requiring SEC filings. See Gellis, supra note 1, at 438. A series of Interpretative Releases
set forth the essential criteria for constituting a NRMSIR. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 54
Fed. Reg. 28,799, 28,808 n.65 (July 10, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Release].
47. A participating underwriter is “any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer.” The
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/20
226.doc 08/24/00
596 Journal of Law and Policy [Vol. 2:587
securities offering: 1) to obtain and review a final official statement
prior to purchase; 2) to send a preliminary official statement to a
potential customer who requests one; 3) to contract with the issuer to
obtain a final official statement; and 4) to send a final official
statement to any potential customer who requests one.48 The Rule
applies to primary offerings of over $1 million in aggregate49 and
exempts certain limited placements and short term obligations.50
rule specifies the duties of a participating underwriter when the underwriter is participating in
“a primary offering of municipal securities with an aggregate principal amount of $1,000,000 or
more.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (1995). The Rule indirectly imposes the duties on the
issuers.
48. The Rule provides:
(1) Prior to the time the Participating Underwriter bids for, purchases, offers, or sells
municipal securities in an Offering, the Participating Underwriter shall obtain and
review an official statement that an issuer of such securities deems final as of its date,
except for the omission of no more than the following information: The offering
price(s), interest rate(s), selling compensation, aggregate principal amount, principal
amount per maturity, delivery dates, any other terms or provisions required by an
issuer of such securities to be specified in a competitive bid, ratings, or other terms of
the securities depending on such matters, and the identity of the underwriter(s).
(2) Except in competitively bid offerings, from the time the Participating Underwriter
has reached an understanding with an issuer of municipal securities that it will become
a Participating Underwriter in an Offering until a final official statement is available,
the Participating Underwriter shall send no later than the next business day, by first-
class mail or other equally prompt means, to any potential customer, on request, a
single copy of the most recent preliminary official statement, if any.
(3) The Participating Underwriter shall contract with an issuer of municipal securities
or its designated agent to receive, within seven business days after any final agreement
to purchase, offer, or sell the municipal securities in an Offering and in sufficient time
to accompany any confirmation that requests payment from any customer, copies of a
final official statement in sufficient quantity to comply with paragraph (b)(4) of this
rule and the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
(4) From the time the final official statement becomes available until the earlier of (i)
Ninety days from the end of the underwriting period or (ii) The time when the official
statement is available to any person from a nationally recognized municipal securities
information repository, but in no case less than twenty-five days following the end of
the underwriting period, the Participating Underwriter in an Offering shall send no
later than the next business day, by first-class mail or other equally prompt means, to
any potential customer, on request, a single copy of the final official statement.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(1)- (4) (1995).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (1995).
50. Certain transactions are exempt in denominations of $100,000 or more. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-12(d)(1) (1995). Under the limited placement exemption, offerings made to no more
than thirty-five sophisticated investors purchasing without a view to distribution are exempt
from the Rule. Id. Short-term transactions, defined as transactions where the securities have a
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Thus, our hypothetical town of Springfield must prepare an official
statement describing the offering and make that official statement
available to investors through the primary underwriter if its municipal
bond offering is over $1 million and no other exemptions apply.51
Furthermore, the amendments to Rule 15c2-12 impose obligations
on Springfield with respect to the secondary trading of its securities.
As with Rule 15c2-12, the regulation is indirect.52 Dealers may not
underwrite municipal bonds unless a municipal issuer agrees to
systematically disclose all pertinent factors which might potentially
affect the value of the underlying bonds.53 In other words, this
amendment requires Springfield to provide annual financial data and
timely updates of material events affecting the issuer and possible
repayment prospects of the bond issue.54 Specifically, the Rule
imposes an ongoing disclosure duty and a recommendation duty.55
The Ongoing Disclosure Rule requires participating underwriters
to reasonably determine that either the issuer or the obligated
person,56 has agreed in writing with the holders of municipal
maturity date of nine months or less, are also exempt from coverage, as are securities with a put
feature under which the holder can demand payment at least as often as every nine months are
also exempt. Id.
51. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the
exemptions available under amended Rule 15c2-12.
52. The Tower Amendment prohibits regulation of issuers of municipal securities.
Because the Tower Amendment prohibits direct and indirect regulation, it has been questioned
whether Rule 15c2-12, as amended, violates the Amendment. See, e.g., Mark Edward
Laughman, The Leaning Tower: Do the Proposed Amendments to SEC Rule 15c2-12 Violate
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975?, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67 (1994).
53. Id. at 1187.
54. Id. at 1188.
55. See Thomas O. McGimpsey, Secondary Market Disclosure: A Reality for Issuers of
Municipal Securities, 28 URB. LAW. 155 (1996).
56. The term “obligated person” includes:
any person, including an issuer of municipal securities, who is either generally or
through an enterprise, fund, or account of such person committed by contract or other
such arrangement to support payment of all, or part of the obligations on the municipal
securities to be sold in the Offering (other than providers of municipal bond insurance,
letters of credit, or other liquidity facilities.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(f)(10) (1995).
Hospital financing provides a useful illustration. Assume that the state health authority
issues bonds and lends the proceeds to a non-profit hospital with the hospital having the sole
obligation to repay the bonds pursuant to the loan agreement between the hospital and the
health authority. In this case, the non-profit corporation is the obligated person and should be
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securities to provide specific information on an ongoing basis. In
general, the required periodic disclosures mirror the financial
information set forth in the final official statement.57 This Rule
requires Springfield, or the obligated person (the state health agency
building the hospital in our hypothetical), to provide financial
information and operating data on a yearly basis and, if available,
audited financial information for each obligated person implicated in
the final official statement.58 Finally, Springfield must agree to
provide certain material events disclosures.59 If Springfield fails to
provide the required ongoing disclosure, subsequent official
statements must disclose this failure.60
As with Rule 15c2-12, Springfield is not required by the
amendments to make any SEC filings. Instead, Springfield must
disclose to either national (NRMSIR) or state (SIR) information
the primary source of key information. See Robert A. Fippinger, SEC Mandates Continuing
Disclosures for States and Political Subdivisions, 9 INSIGHTS 17, 18-20 (1995). The contract
commits the obligated person to support payment of the debt obligation. See Municipal
Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,590, 59,596 (Nov.
10, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Release, 2]. In our hypothetical, Springfield is clearly the issuer, but
the obligated person might be the state health authority. This affects disclosure and potential
liability. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
57. See Frederic H. Marienthal et al., New SEC Amendments Mandate Secondary Market
Disclosure for Municipal Issuers, 24 COLO. LAW. 2359, 2360 (1995).
58. 17 C.F.R. 15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(A)-(B) (1995).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C) lists eleven material events:
(1) Principal and interest payment delinquencies;
(2) Non-payment related defaults;
(3) Unscheduled draws on debt service reserves reflecting financial difficulties;
(4) Unscheduled draws on credit enhancement reflecting financial difficulties;
(5) Substitution of credit or liquidity providers, or their failure to perform;
(6) Adverse tax opinions or events affecting tax-exempt status of the security;
(7) Modifications to rights of security holders;
(8) Bond calls;
(9) Defeasances;
(10) Release, substitution, or sale of property securing repayment of the securities;
(11) Rating changes.
Id.
60. Disclosure of such failure must continue for a five-year period. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-12(f)(3) (1995).
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repositories. 61 Material events disclosures and notice of failure to
provide required information must also be disclosed to the MSRB.62
The Rule, however, fails to specify the scope of the required
disclosures for Springfield’s bond issue. Because the contract
between Springfield and its underwriters, by and large, does define
the scope of the disclosure obligation, perhaps the best indicator of
what information Springfield must disclose is the contract itself. The
participants determine which parties are material to the offering and
must provide ongoing disclosures, as well as what information is
material and must be disclosed.63 Rule 15c2-12, then, imposes a duty
to annually update the financial information and operating data set
forth in the final official statement.
The extent to which Springfield is entitled to remain silent as to
other information is also unclear. On the one hand, some
commentators argue that the issuer has no obligation to disclose
events, even if they are material, if they are not one of the eleven
material events listed in Rule 15c2-12.64 Springfield would have no
disclosure obligation even if one of the eleven events occurred, as
long as the occurrence was immaterial.65 On the other hand, while the
Rule requires notice only of enumerated events, some believe that
occurrence of an unlisted material event might also trigger a duty to
disclose and create liability for nondisclosure.66
61. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(A) (1995).
62. See Stanley Keller, SEC Adopts Rule 15c2-12 Amendments to Improve Municipal
Securities Secondary Market Disclosure, 9 INSIGHTS 35, 36 (1995).
63. See id. The SEC explicitly rejected the “line item” disclosures required of corporate
securities because of the diverse nature of issuing municipalities. Fippinger, supra note 45, at
18-19. Similarly, the SEC decided not to tie the ongoing disclosure directly to the disclosures in
the final official statement, fearing that such a requirement would reduce the quality of primary
market disclosures. See Keller, supra note 62, at 36. Nevertheless, the participating underwriter
must go beyond the assurances found in the bond purchase agreement and investigate the
issuer’s actual efforts to comply with the promise to provide ongoing information. See 1994
Release 2, supra note 56, at 59,592.
64. General principles of law do not require disclosure without a duty to disclose. See
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12-14 (1st Cir. 1990). See also Dennis L. Holsapple &
Curtis L. Christensen, SEC Rule 15c2-12 and Ongoing Disclosure Obligations of Municipal
Securities, 27 URB. LAW. 943, 950-51 (1995).
65. See 1994 Release 2, supra note 56, at 590,600.
66. Either common law fraud or violations of Rule 10b-5 could serve as the basis for
liability. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing potential for 10b-5 liability). An
issuer cannot incur 10b-5 liability if it remains silent. Issuers do not, however, typically remain
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Springfield may not be bound by the disclosure requirements if it
qualifies for an exemption. The exemptions mirror the exemptions of
the unamended Rule. Private placements, short term municipal
bonds,67 and offerings by certain “small issuers,” are exempt.68
Offerings that have a stated maturity of 18 months or less qualify for
a limited exemption.69 Finally, the SEC may grant a transactional
exemption if the exemption is “consistent with the public interest and
the protection of investors.”70
Whether and to what extent Springfield is subject to the ongoing
disclosure obligations set forth in Rule 15c2-12 depends, of course,
on the nature of the contract, the contents of the official statement,
the length of the offering, the investors to whom the securities are
offered, and whether Springfield qualifies for the “small issuer”
exemption.71 Given the fact that 71% of the 52,000 municipal issuers
in 1994 had less than $10 million in outstanding securities,72
silent. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. Public statements, for example, create a duty
to release material information. See Statement of the commission Regarding Disclosure
obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7049, 59
Fed. Reg. 12,748, 12,756 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Release 1]. See generally Holsapple &
Christensen, supra note 64, at 949-54.
67. The ongoing disclosure rule does not apply to primary offerings in denominations of
$100,000 or more if: 1) they are sold to no more than 35 persons, and if the principal
underwriter reasonably believes the following: 1) the purchaser is a sophisticated investor
purchasing without a view to distribution; 2) the bonds have a maturity of nine months or less;
or 3) the securities have a put feature under which the holder can tender the security back to the
issuer at least as often as every nine months until maturity, earlier redemption, or purchase by
the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(1) (1995). This has been termed the “Big Boy— Short
Term— Put Bond Exemption.” See McGimpsey, supra note 55, at 161. Under what has been
termed the cross-over exemption, this exemption also exempts the primary underwriter. See id.
at 162.
68. Under this exemption, the ongoing disclosure rule does not apply if no obligated
person will be obligated for more than $10 million at the time of initial delivery of the bonds to
the primary underwriter. The $10 million figure refers to the aggregate principal amount of the
offering, and includes the obligations exempt under the Big Boy— Short Term— Put Bond
Exemption. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(2)(i) (1995). Further, to qualify for this exemption, the
issuer must agree to provide upon request (at least annually) financial information or operating
data to a state repository, and the final official statement must make clear whom to contact to
get the required information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(2)(ii) (1995).
69. The requirement to provide annual financial information does not apply to such
securities; however, the securities remain, however, subject to the material events disclosure
requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(3) (1995).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(e) (1995).
71. See supra notes 67-69.
72. See 1994 Release 2, supra note 56, at 59,606.
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Springfield probably will qualify for this exemption.
Furthermore, the Recommendation Rule of the amendments to
Rule 15c2-12 might impact Springfield’s disclosure obligations.
Under the Recommendation Rule, it is unlawful for any broker or
dealer of municipal securities to recommend the purchase or sale of a
municipal security (in either the primary or secondary market) unless
the broker or dealer has procedures in place to reasonably assure that
it will receive prompt notice of 1) material events, and 2) any failure
of the issuer (or obligated person) to provide annual financial
information as contracted.73 The Rule does not explicitly require
dealers to review the ongoing disclosure74 because of the belief that
the MSRB’s “fair dealing” and “suitability”75 rules implicitly require
such review76 in order for the dealer to have a reasonable basis for its
recommendation. The nature of the required procedures is not
specified in the Rule.77 What is clear, however, is that the brokers and
dealers who market Springfield’s municipal securities will likely
demand assurances from Springfield of material event disclosures
and financial updates.
Springfield is faced with a complicated system of municipal bond
regulation. There is virtually no state regulation78 and municipal
bonds are exempt from the registration requirements of both the 1933
and 1934 Acts. Federal regulations do require, however indirectly,
that a final official statement accompany new offerings, and also
require dissemination of the official statement to the market either
through the MSRB or NRMSIRs.79 In addition, the issuer80 is liable
for any misstatements that might occur in that document.81 There is,
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c) (1995).
74. The SEC considered such a requirement in the proposal prior to the adopted
amendments. See 1994 Release 1, supra note 66, at 12,759.
75. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
76. See Keller, supra note 62, at 36; McGimpsey, supra note 56, at 161.
77. 17 C.F.R. 240.15.12. 
78. See Gellis, supra note 1, at 435 n.27. See also supra notes 14-22 and accompanying
text (discussing diverse state regulations in effect today).
79. See 1988 Release, supra note 42, at 37787.
80. Underwriters also have a duty to make reasonable investigations prior to an offering
and must have a reasonable basis for belief in the claims made in the issuer’s official statement.
See 1988 Release, supra note 42, at 37,787.
81. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty surrounding
liability). Specifically, what is the nature of this liability? To whom is this liability owed? What
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however, no requirement that investors actually see the official
statement, unless they request a copy.82 The content and form of the
disclosure documents remains unregulated.83 A “passive form” of
disclosure regulation, therefore, is in place.84
In summary, the current framework for regulation of municipal
securities consists of limited federal regulation by Rule 15c2-12 and
its amendments,85 quasi-administrative regulation by the MSRB,86
voluntary industry guidelines set forth by the GFOA87 and a system
of state regulation that is by no means uniform.88 As a result of this
complex regulation framework, the disclosure requirements imposed
on the issuers of municipal securities vary dramatically from state to
state and from issue to issue.
The question, then, is what disclosures should Springfield make?
It must prepare an official statement and, although there are no
specific content requirements in federal securities regulations or state
blue sky laws, the GFOA offers voluntary guidelines.89 In addition,
Springfield must be prepared to update the material set forth in the
official statement, and to provide certain material events disclosures
subsequent to the primary offering.90 Some commentators claim that
there are gaps in these disclosure requirements that leave investors
inadequately protected.91 The gaps in these disclosure requirements,
defenses are available?
82. This is in marked contrast to the registration requirements under the 1933 Act, for
example, which require that each investor be given a prospectus prior to an offer to buy or sell.
Securities Act of 1988 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1988). The underlying assumption in the
instance of municipal bonds is not that each investor must be given material information so that
he or she can make an informed choice, but instead, “that the market ‘should have access to
information, so that the market price reflects such information.
83. See Gellis, supra note 1, at 440; Kiernan, supra note 10, at 709-10. Recall, however,
that municipal bonds are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Therefore, while there are no explicit content requirements for the official statement, there is
still a general prohibition against materially misleading statements.
84. See Gellis, supra note 26, at 69-71. Professor Gellis calls this a “passive form” of
disclosure regulation because the provisions apply only to what the issuer voluntarily chooses
to say. There are no affirmative disclosure requirements.
85. See supra notes 7, 43-55.
86. See supra notes 30-42.
87. See supra notes 11-13.
88. See supra notes 14-20.
89. See supra notes 11-13.
90. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
91. See Fairchild & Ellis, supra note 7.
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however, also negatively impact issuers. To understand how the gaps
in coverage impact issuers, it is first important to understand how
disclosure affects issuer interests.
II. INCENTIVES FOR MUNICIPAL ISSUERS TO DISCLOSE
There are many incentives for municipal issuers to disclose
voluntarily. Disclosure improves the functioning of the market by
making it more efficient and by increasing liquidity. Efficient and
liquid markets benefit issuers as well as investors. The following
sections highlight the benefits to issuers resulting from disclosure.
A. Resolution of Asymmetric Information Problems
Without disclosure, the problem of asymmetric information
between the issuer of securities and investors arises. Specifically,
asymmetric information occurs when the investor has insufficient
knowledge about the issuer.92 The issuer, of course, knows the truth
about the risk of its securities, but without disclosure of this
information, the investor is unable to make an accurate assessment of
such risk. There are two forms of asymmetric information: 1) adverse
selection, and 2) moral hazard.93 Both forms are relevant to the
discussion of how municipal issuers benefit from market disclosure.
1. Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is the presence of asymmetric information
before the transaction occurs.94 For example, suppose a person who
just lost a job borrows money to buy a house. The borrower knows
that he or she does not have steady income with which to repay the
loan and does not disclose this information to the lender. Assuming
the borrower is not independently wealthy, there is a high likelihood
of default. According to adverse selection, it is these borrowers, i.e.
92. See FREDERIC MISHKIN, FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY 220
(1995).
93. See id.
94. See generally id.
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those most likely to default, who most eagerly seek loans.95
Adverse selection is an impediment to well-functioning markets.
The disruption of the market resulting from adverse selection
resembles the problem created by “lemons” in the used car market
and for this reason, it is often referred to as the “lemons problem.”96
To illustrate the effect of the “lemons problem” on market
functioning, assume that there are two types of cars sold in the used
car market— problematic cars (“lemons”) and reliable cars
(“peaches”). Further assume that potential buyers of used cars are
unable to determine the quality of used cars being sold; that is,
potential buyers cannot discern between lemons and peaches because
there is a lack of available information.97 Because potential used car
buyers cannot determine vehicle quality, they will only be willing to
pay a price for a used car that reflects the average quality of the cars
being sold.98 Hence, a buyer’s offer price will be somewhere between
the low value of a lemon and the high value of a peach.99
The seller of a used car knows if his or her car is a lemon or a
peach.100 If the car is a lemon, the seller is more than happy to accept
the buyer’s offer price.101 The seller of a lemon knows the offer price
is greater than the value of the lemon because it reflects the average
value of a lemon and a peach.102 On the other hand, if the car is a
peach the seller will not accept the buyer’s offer price because he or
she knows the car is undervalued by the buyer.103 The presence of
adverse selection deters the sale of good cars because they are
undervalued.104 Everyone, however, will be very willing to sell
lemons and therefore the average quality of cars will fall.105 Buyers
will recognize that there are only lemons on the market and become
95. See generally id. at 229.
96. See generally George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
97. See generally id. at 489.
98. See MISHKIN, supra note 92, at 230.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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unwilling to buy.106 The result is that there will be few, if any, cars
sold.107 The market will fail to function.108
The “lemons problem” in the securities markets is analogous to
that described above for the used car market. In the securities
markets, “lemons” are bonds issued by issuers whose securities carry
high risk and low expected profit. Peaches are bonds sold by issuers
whose securities carry low risk and high expected profit.109 If
investors cannot distinguish between lemons and peaches in the
securities market, ultimately the market will not function.110 Only
lemons will be brought to market and investors will not be willing to
buy the securities because they recognize that only lemons are being
sold.111
The lemons problem occurs only when there is information
asymmetry among market participants.112 Disclosure by securities
issuers, therefore, helps to resolve the lemons problem. Assuming the
information provided in disclosure documents is timely and accurate,
investors can adequately distinguish lemons from peaches. As a
result, investors will be willing to pay the fair market value for
securities. Good issuers, therefore, have an incentive to disclose so as
to avoid having their securities undervalued by investors.
Good issuers also have an incentive to disclose to negate the
assumption that they are selling lemons. Investors automatically
assume that issuers who do not disclose are selling bad securities.113
Suspicious investors, therefore, would be unwilling to buy securities
without disclosure or would purchase these securities only if a
substantial risk premium were attached.
Springfield would benefit from disclosure because disclosure
allows investors to see Springfield’s securities as “peaches” and to
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See generally MISHKIN, supra note 92, at 230.
110. See generally id.
111. See generally id.
112. See generally id. at 231.
113. See generally Akerlof, supra note 96, at 490.
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price the securities accordingly. In addition, disclosure would reduce
the risk premium attached to Springfield’s bonds.114
2. Moral Hazard
A moral hazard is an asymmetric information problem occurring
after a transaction takes place.115 Moral hazard exists when a security
issuer withholds material information or engages in risky activities
that jeopardize the repayment of debt.116 For example, suppose a
borrower tells a lender that he or she wants to borrow money to build
a house. After the loan is made, however, the borrower takes the loan
proceeds, goes to Las Vegas and gambles away the loan money
instead of building a house. The lender is never repaid.
Information provided by mandatory disclosure requirements,
especially ongoing disclosure requirements, helps solve the moral
hazard problem.117 Disclosure forces issuers to adhere to standards
such as standard accounting principles. For investors, this makes it
easier to monitor the issuer and verify profitability.
Moral hazard can be particularly problematic among municipal
issuers because the assets funded by bond issues are, in many cases,
public assets. Creditors cannot seize public assets in the event of a
default or municipal bankruptcy. Because issuers know that the assets
cannot be seized, there is little incentive to do a thorough analysis of
project viability prior to undertaking the project.
The $2.25 billion WPPSS default in 1983 is a good example of the
moral hazard problem within the municipal bond market.118 The
bonds involved in this default funded two nuclear reactor building
projects. SEC investigation following the default revealed that
WPPSS failed to disclose important financial information to
114. “Good” issuers benefit from mandatory disclosure also because if the “bad” issuers
are forced to disclose, investors can better discriminate between good and bad bonds.
115. See MISHKIN, supra note 92, at 229.
116. See id.
117. There are a number of other ways to resolve the moral hazard problem, for example,
protective covenants within the bond indenture and financial intermediaries. For a discussion of
these solutions, see MISHKIN, supra note 92, at 239-41. Because this paper focuses on
disclosure, we limit our discussion to how disclosure solves the moral hazard problem.
118. See generally id.
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investors.119 If WPPSS had provided ongoing disclosure, the financial
problems would likely have been discovered before they became
insurmountable.120
Similarly, disclosure by Springfield would reduce the moral
hazard problem. Furthermore, Springfield’s adherence to standard
accounting procedures and ongoing disclosure would reduce investor
uncertainty.
B. Market Efficiency
Resolution of asymmetric information problems through
disclosure fosters market efficiency (to the extent that capital market
efficiency depends upon the free flow of information),121 because,
according to theoretical and empirical studies, increased information
flow improves efficiency.122
Informational efficiency facilitated by disclosure requirements is
beneficial to issuers for several reasons. If markets are
informationally efficient, market prices are trustworthy valuations of
an investment’s worth. When the current market price reflects all
available information, the market price equals the intrinsic value of
the security.123 The intrinsic value is the present value of the future
cash flows an investor expects to receive from a security.124
When markets are informationally efficient, issuers can be
confident that they are receiving fair market value when they issue
securities. This is important for two reasons. First, when markets are
informationally efficient, investor confidence increases, causing
capital to flow into the market. Second, investor confidence about the
price of a security reduces transaction costs. Otherwise, investors
would need to spend a great deal of time and effort to perform their
own valuation of the security. Issuer disclosure acts to minimize or
119. See John Petersen, Information Flows in the Municipal Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF
MUNICIPAL BONDS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 687 (Robert Lamb, et al., eds., 1993).
120. See generally id. at 687-88.
121. See EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133-34 (1976).
122. See id. at 133-63.
123. See PHILIP COOLEY & PEYTON F. RODEN, BUSINESS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 187
(2d ed. 1991).
124. See id. at 164.
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eliminate the costs involved in such a valuation because the market
price accurately reflects the value of the security.
Informationally efficient markets also result in reduced investor
uncertainty and decreased volatility regarding returns. With more
complete information, investors can determine more precisely the
risk of a particular security, and therefore, can more precisely
estimate expected returns.125 The increased quantity and quality of
information provided by disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty
surrounding expected returns, which translates into lower
volatility.126 As a result, the risk premium127 on securities subject to
disclosure is lower than risk premiums on otherwise comparable
securities not subject to disclosure.128 Issuers benefit because lower
risk premiums result in lower costs of borrowing and decreased
volatility surrounding the security returns.129
The informational efficiency associated with disclosure provides
an added benefit unique to municipal issuers. Pricing accuracy can
signal potential future shortfalls in tax revenue, allowing for
appropriate adjustments to the level of government services provided
with the bond revenue.130 Disclosure, eliminates the potential
disparity between municipal expenditures and the ability to finance
125. See id.
126. See Jarrell, infra note 128. Jarrell assumes that investors possess little information
about issuers at the time of issuance and form unbiased expectations of the issuing firm's
systematic risk and future payouts from its securities. He then asserts that mandatory disclosure
requirements provide more complete information about new issues and enable investors to
make more precise predictions about the future prospects of the issuing firm. In this context,
disclosure requirements should reduce investors' uncertainty, thereby decreasing the dispersion
of the distribution of expected future payoffs from the issuing firm.
127. The risk premium is the differential in yield between the security in question and a
default-free one, with all factors other than default risk held constant. See JAMES VAN HORNE,
FINANCIAL MARKET RATES AND FLOWS 141 (1978).
128. See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market
for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981); Carol Simon, The Effect of the 1933
Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
295 (1989) (discussing how disclosure affects risk premiums).
129. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 128, at 304-13 (setting forth specific empirical results). A
1989 study by Carol Simon provides strong evidence that disclosure reduces volatility. Simon
examined the effect of the 1933 Act disclosure requirements and found that mandatory
disclosure requirements did not affect average risk-adjusted returns for issues with low
information costs (e.g., seasoned issues and NYSE-listed firms).
130. See Gellis, supra note 26, at 69.
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those expenditures through the capital markets.131 In an informed
marketplace, this disparity is more likely to be recognized before it
reaches a critical point requiring unexpected reductions in the level of
services.132
C. Improved Liquidity
When investors trust market prices due to informational
efficiency, they more actively buy and sell securities in the secondary
market. This in turn creates liquidity, which is important for issuers
as well as investors.133 Issuers’ knowledge of the market conditions
affecting their securities is advantageous134 because issuer officials
can monitor the trading patterns in the secondary market for their
bonds, which is especially useful when the issuer anticipates future
offerings.135 For example, the task of pricing a new issue is easier
when there an active secondary market for an issuer’s existing bonds
that gives pricing information that is indicative of what price is
suitable for the new issue.136 Price information also helps issuers
estimate investor interest in new issues.137
In many cases, issuers want to actively promote new issues
coming to market.138 If an issuer can demonstrate that its existing
bonds have consistent trading patterns, investors are more likely to
show interest in purchasing future issues.139 Moreover, investors may
be willing to pay a premium for issues with considerable liquidity.140
Hence, liquidity attracts investors to the market.
Clearly, disclosure benefits Springfield, because it allows the
market to price Springfield’s bonds accurately, improves liquidity in
the market, and reduces both investor uncertainty and volatility. The
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Heather L. Ruth, Municipal Bond Price Transparency: What It Means for Issuers,
6 GOV’T FIN. REV. 21, 24 (1995)
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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benefits of disclosure, therefore, outweigh any increased costs141 of
disclosure.142
III. POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR ISSUERS UNDER RULE 15C2-12
Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments indirectly require disclosure by
municipal issuers within primary and secondary markets.143
Unfortunately, the regulatory scheme imposed by the Rule is
inadequate. The scheme is inadequate because the Rule 1) fails to
detail the disclosure requirements with a sufficient degree of
specificity; and 2) fails to specify the liability for noncompliance.144
It is important for issuers, such as our hypothetical issuer Springfield,
to understand to what extent the Rule and its amendments change
existing law. Without this understanding, Springfield, and even
Springfield executives, may face potential liability, especially to
investors. This potential liability stems from gaps in the Rule and its
amendments.
Rule 15c2-12 addresses the primary market disclosure process and
increases the importance of the official statement. First, the Rule is
inadequate because, although it essentially requires issuers to provide
official statements, the official statement’s content is still
nonstandardized. Under Rule 15c2-12, the SEC only makes
suggestions regarding the appropriate content of the official
statement, which currently coincide with those advocated by the
GFOA and the National Federation of Municipal Analysts. The SEC
intentionally declined to specify the content of the official statement
to provide flexibility and to respond to industry concerns raised
during the rulemaking process.145 However, the resulting uncertainty
creates a flawed regulatory scheme. In this context, flexibility creates
gaps that may trap unwary issuers.
141. See Gellis, supra note 26, at 95-99 (discussing increased issuer costs associated with
disclosure).
142. There are documented benefits associated with disclosure. See Fairchild & Koch,
supra note 14. Although benefits are documented, measurement of the costs of disclosure is
difficult, if not impossible, because municipal issues and issuers are heterogeneous.
143. See generally supra note 20.
144. See infra notes 145-54.
145. See Fippinger, supra note 56, at 18, 19.
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Second, the Rule is inadequate because it fails to specify liability
for noncompliance. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this inadequacy
is to contrast the treatment of municipal bonds with that of corporate
securities. Issuers of corporate securities must distribute a
prospectus,146 and they face clear statutory liability for
noncompliance.147 In addition, the statute governing corporate issuers
creates a private cause of action for misstatements in the registration
statement and prospectus,148 and provides potential defendants.149
Rule 15c2-12, on the other hand, fails to establish liability for
noncompliance by municipal bond issuers. Because the Rule does not
specify penalties for failure to use an official statement, liability for
misstatements is unclear.150 In addition, although statutory
obligations for secondary disclosures exist for both corporate and
municipal issuers, Rule 15c2-12 again fails to specify liability for
noncompliance.151 Municipal issuers remain uncertain of their
potential liability and how to avoid it. In the following sections, we
highlight the potential pitfalls faced by issuers in the primary and
secondary market caused by the nonspecificity of the Rule and the
uncertainty of liability.
A. Potential Pitfalls of the Primary Market Disclosure Process
Because Rule 15c2-12 specifies neither the required contents of
the official statement nor the potential liability for noncompliance in
the primary offering, issuers face a high degree of uncertainty.152
1. Use of Professionals to Prepare the Official Statement
Because the parties control the content of the official statement
through the contract terms, disclosure is essentially voluntary.153 In
146. Section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994).
147. Section 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (1994).
148. Section 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k,l (1994).
149. The list of possible defendants under § 11 includes the issuer, underwriter, broker-
dealer, experts, and officers and directors of the issuer. Id.
150. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (1995).
151. See id.
152. See infra notes 154-60.
153. See id.
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general, most issuers rely on financial advisors, underwriters and/or
the underwriters’ counsel to prepare the official statement and other
disclosure documents.154 Reliance on these professionals can benefit
the issuers. These benefits accrue, however, only when the
professionals have a sense of responsibility to the issuer and are
knowledgeable of securities laws and disclosure responsibilities.
Without a sense of responsibility to the issuer, professionals may not
act carefully when preparing the disclosure documents because only
the issuer is ultimately responsible for the disclosure documents.155
This creates a potential pitfall for issuers who are not well-versed in
securities law, as they may be unaware of their ultimate
responsibility.156 Although the professionals recognize this fact, many
are uncomfortable with challenging issuers regarding the accuracy
and completeness of the information being provided.157 Thus, the
professional may fail to correct unintentional misstatements for
which the issuer may be liable.
Moreover, the Rule provides little incentive for underwriters to
thoroughly investigate the official statement because it is unlikely
that they will be sued by investors for misstatements in the official
statement under the antifraud provisions.158 Again, this uncertainty
for municipal issuers should be contrasted with the clear liability
scheme set forth for corporate securities. Under corporate securities
regulations, both issuers and underwriters are liable for misstatements
in the prospectus, which provides underwriters with an incentive to
assure the accuracy of the prospectus.159 These incentives are lacking
for municipal bond offerings.
Hence, issuers should view the use of professionals only as a tool
to assist in the preparation of disclosure documents. Because the
154. See Robert W. Doty, Special Disclosure Considerations for State and Local
Government Securities Issuers, 18 MUN. FIN. J. 43 (1997). See also Petersen, supra note 119, at
642-44.
155. This is, of course, complicated by the fact that the nature of this liability is unclear.
See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainties of liability).
156. For more detail, see Doty, supra note 154, at 43.
157. See 1989 Release, supra note 42, at 28,811-28,812 (emphasizing liability of municipal
issuers with respect to disclosure).
158. Compared to the corporate securities markets, there have been few incidences of fraud
in the municipal market. See Gellis, supra note 26, at 73-74.
159. See supra notes 146-47.
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municipal issuer, not the professional preparing the disclosure, is
ultimately liable for misleading disclosure or misstatements,
municipal issuers should closely scrutinize all information
disclosed.160
2. Use of Underwriter’s Counsel
The problems associated with the use of professionals to prepare
the official statement are complicated by the standard use of an
underwriter’s counsel by municipal issuers.161 Historically, municipal
issuers have relegated preparation of the disclosure documents to the
underwriter’s counsel. This practice began in the late 1970s when
investors began demanding more complete disclosure. Underwriters,
as a result, feared increased risk of liability.162 Issuers, reluctant to
pay fees to hire their own counsel, began to rely on underwriter’s
counsel. Eventually, the underwriters began charging for use of their
counsel. Instead of hiring their own counsel, issuers paid the
additional fees to the underwriter, and by convention, still allowed
the counsel to be employed by the underwriter.163 This practice is still
common. However, it is a risky practice for the issuer because the
underwriter’s counsel usually does not have a contractual or fiduciary
obligation to the issuer164 and is formally obligated only to the
160. In Maricopa County, Arizona, however, the SEC acted against both the issuer and its
financial advisor. See, e.g., In re Peacock, Hislop, Staley, and Given, Inc. (PHS&G), Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-3777 (October 2, 1996); In re Maricopa County, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-37779 (October 3, 1996). The SEC based its claim against the
county on Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5. In re Peacock, Hislop, Staley and Given, Inc., the SEC
brought a public cease and desist proceeding against PHS&G and its president as the financial
advisors to Maricopa County in connection with two general obligation bond offerings. The
financial statements presented in the official statement were over a year old and failed to reflect
material changes in the general financial condition of the county. The SEC reasoned that
PHS&G and Given had recklessly aided and abetted the county in violation of Section 17(a)
and Rule 10b-5.
161. See Petersen, supra note 119, at 644.
162. The role of bond counsel entails, but is not limited to, opining on the legality of the
issue, tax status, and the form of the bond. In many cases, only one counsel (that of the
underwriter) is used. The underwriter’s counsel prepares the disclosure documents and issues
opinions on the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure. The issuer’s counsel, if also employed
in the transaction, has a limited role in the disclosure preparation process, i.e., the underwriter’s
counsel still prepares the disclosure documents. See Petersen, supra note 119, at 643-44.
163. See id. at 644.
164. See id.
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underwriter. Because disclosure is ultimately the issuer’s
responsibility, it is less risky, and certainly makes more sense, for the
issuer to hire its own counsel (or other professional).165 The issuer
can then use the employment contract to create a fiduciary duty owed
by its own counsel to the issuer.166
To some extent the problem of relying on underwriter’s counsel is
a problem of the issuer’s making. The failure of Rule 15c2-12 to
specify underwriter liability, however, exacerbates the problem. If the
underwriter had clear liability for misstatements in the official
statement, as it would for misstatements in a corporate prospectus,
the underwriter’s counsel would serve the interests of both the
underwriter and the municipal issuer.167 The underwriter and the
underwriter’s counsel would have similar interests in assuring that
the official statement accurately reflected the financial and
nonfinancial situation of the issuer; they would both have liability if
it did not.168
3. Timeliness of Audited Financial Statements
Although the SEC does not explicitly specify the content of the
official statement,169 most issuers include audited financial
statements.170 Problems may arise when an issuer uses these
statements during the post-audit period.171 As time elapses after the
audit period, material changes will likely occur. For this reason,
investors may view the inclusion of outdated audited financial
statements in the official statement as materially misleading
information.172 Issuers can avoid this problem by having the auditors
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 645.
168. See generally id.
169. See generally supra notes 146-47.
170. See Doty, supra note 154.
171. See id. at 54.
172. In cases involving Maricopa County, Arizona, and Orange County, California, the
SEC found that these issuers had provided audited financial statements over a year old in the
official statement. In both cases, material events had occurred which were not reflected in the
financial statements. As a result, the SEC deemed the use of the financial statements to be
materially misleading. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County, supra note 160. See also Doty, supra
note 154, at 54.
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conduct an events review prior to including audited financial
statements in the official statement. This would enable the auditors to
detect the impact on the financial health of the issuer of any material
events during the post-audit period.173
Rule 15c2-12’s nonspecificity with respect to the official
statement’s contents contributes to this problem.174 In the corporate
securities market, federal regulations require specific prospectus
contents and impose detailed periodic disclosure requirements.175
Moreover, corporate securities regulations explicitly define
liability.176 For these reasons, corporate issuers regularly conduct
post-audit reviews.177 Because Rule 15c2-12 is vague regarding the
official statements contents and liability for municipal bond issuers,
and because there is no regulatory motivation for municipal issuers to
initiate a post-audit review, many municipal issuers do not conduct
post-audit reviews.178
4. Individual Investor Litigation
Although issuers are ultimately liable for their disclosure
documents, the SEC has limited resources available to pursue actions
against issuers. Historically, the SEC has pursued only a few selected
cases.179 While issuers may consider the lack of SEC action as good
news, the bad news is that issuers still face the threat of litigation
from individual investors. The threat of litigation arises not only in
the case of default, but also when there is a loss of bond value due to
an undisclosed change in financial condition or as a result of
secondary market transactions.180
The extent to which municipal issuers face liability to investors is,
173. See Doty, supra note 154, at 54.
174. See infra note 178.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Doty, supra note 154, at 54, 55.
179. See id. at 47.
180. Based on a “benefit of the bargain” argument, investors can claim “they have received
less than that for which they bargained.” See Doty, supra note 154, at 47. This is similar to the
damages available to investors of corporate securities for misstatements in the registration
materials.
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as discussed above, uncertain. The Rule fails to specify the nature of
this liability, possible plaintiffs, possible defendants or possible
defenses.181 This uncertainty is problematic. Although there are no
reported cases of investors suing for noncompliance with the
disclosure requirements of Rule 15c2-12, the threat is a real one.
Moreover, evidence of a Rule 15c2-12 violation could support a 10b-
5 claim.182 The potential for liability is significant, and the Rule’s
failure to specify a liability scheme is fatal.
5. Personal Liability of Issuer Officials
The potential for liability does not stop with the municipal issuer.
In addition to the potential liability faced by issuers, key issuer
officials may face personal liability for violations of securities
regulations in extreme cases. The precedent for personal liability of
key officials is the SEC’s investigation of Orange County,
California.183 It came as no surprise that the SEC took action against
the county’s treasurer and assistant treasurer, because these officials
allegedly were responsible for, and lied in, the disclosures. During its
investigation, however, the SEC determined also that the Orange
County supervisors were personally liable because they allegedly
failed to satisfactorily disclose their knowledge of material facts;
instead, they delegated their responsibility of disclosure review and
recommendations to bond professionals.184
The potential for personal liability of key issuer officials is
significant because most officials “know” a great deal of information
about the issuing entity and this information is potentially
“material.”185 In the Orange County investigation, the SEC placed
direct responsibility on key officials for reviewing and investigating
every disclosure document with respect to completeness and material
181. Contrast this, for example, with the due diligence defense clearly allowed for
corporate securities. Section 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1988).
182. See infra note 203.
183. Report of Investigation in the Matter of County of Orange, California as it Related to
the Conduct of the Members of the Board of Supervisors, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
36761 (January 24, 1996).
184. See id.
185. See Doty, supra note 154, at 49.
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accuracy.186 In assigning this responsibility, the SEC assumed that the
elected officials had the necessary sophistication to make judgments
regarding materiality.187 Hence, the outcome of the investigation of
Orange County sends a strong message to issuers and key officials:
knowledge of securities law is essential to avoid the personal liability
pitfall.188
This raises the additional question of personal liability of issuer
officials to private plaintiffs. Again, the Rule’s failure to specify a
liability scheme is dangerous to issuers and to issuer officials.
6. Definition of an Obligated Person
Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments tie the disclosure required
within the primary and secondary market to the issuer or an obligated
person.189 For the majority of issuers, the obligated person can be
easily determined. Conduit bonds, however, complicate the definition
of an obligated person because the conduit borrower, not the
municipal issuer of the conduit bonds is the obligated person.
Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments,
disclosures must provide information with respect to the obligated
person, not the municipal issuer of the conduit bond.190 Similarly,
ongoing disclosures must provide information concerning the
continued financial health of the obligated person, not the municipal
issuer. The municipal issuer is, however, the party responsible for
making the principal and interest payments.191
Disclosures limited to the obligated person, and ignoring the
issuer, fail to adequately protect investors in some situations.192 In
addition, such disclosures expose the issuer to potential liability to
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. On November 10, 1995, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated “When someone goes on
a board, even if it is the school board, I want them to be as mindful of disclosure and securities
laws as directors of a corporate enterprise. I have no patience with municipal officials who say
that ‘we didn’t understand,” N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at C1.
189. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (defining obligated person).
190. See supra note 42.
191. See id.
192. See Fairchild & Ellis, supra note 7.
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private persons. 193 For this reason, issuers should err on the side of
providing information about the financial health of the municipal
issuer in addition to the obligated person. By providing this
information, issuers reduce their liability exposure, 194 reassure
investors,195 and increase the efficient operation of the market. 196
C. Potential Pitfalls of the Secondary Market Disclosure Process
Securities laws impose obligations on both corporate and
municipal issuers for secondary disclosures. 197 The disclosure
obligations are clearly set forth in the corporate securities arena, and
liability for noncompliance is clear. 198 Again, however, the specifics
of disclosure and the liability for noncompliance are unclear in the
area of municipal bonds. 199
The amendments to Rule 15c2-12 require issuers to provide
ongoing disclosure within the municipal bond market. 200 Specifically,
underwriters must obtain an issuer’s commitment to provide ongoing
disclosure after the initial sale of bonds by filing informatioin with
each national repository and a state information repository (if one
exists).201 In general, the potential pitfalls for issuers in the secondary
market arise in two areas: 1) disclosure of material events ; and 2)
failure to provide ongoing information.
1. Disclosure of Material Events
Under general principles of law, there is no obligation for
municipal issuers to disclose information, even material
information. 202 Rule 15c2-12 creates a limited duty to disclose by
requiring issuers to annually update the financial information and
193. See id.
194. See generally Doty, supra note 154.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See supra note 154.
198. See id.
199. See supra notes 147-54.
200. See supra notes 24-27.
201. See id.
202. See infra note 204.
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operating data set forth in the final official  statement. 203 As discussed
above, the extent to which the issuer must disclose other information
is unclear.204 This uncertainty creates problems for the issuer. On the
one hand, some commentators argue that the occurrence of a material
event, even one not included on the enumerated list of eleven, 205
triggers a duty to disclose. 206 Rule 15c2-12 fails, however, to specify
liability for noncompliance. 207 Issuer noncompliance could subject
the issuer to liability under Rule 10b-5. 208 Again, the uncertainty of
Rule 15c2-12 liability, coupled with the unclear interactions between
Rule 15c2-12 and Rule 10b-5, leaves the issuer unprotected.
On the other hand, it appears that the issuer might have no
obligation to disclose events— even material events, if they are not
listed as one of the eleven material events 209— as long as they remain
absolutely silent. 210 Even under this view, however, the issuer is
vulnerable to liability. Municipal issuers can seldom remain
absolutely silent. 211 Because municipal issuers are public entities,
matters related to bond issues and the financial health of the issuer
tend to be discussed openly, whether at a board meeting or council
meeting. 212 Hence, material information, even event information not
listed as one of the eleven material events, will likely become public
because municipal issuers rarely remain absolutely silent.
203. SEC Rule 10b-5 also applies to disclosures made according to Rule 15c2-12 and its
amendments. See supra note 28.
204. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
205. See Robert A. Fippinger, SEC Mandates Continuing Disclosure for States and
Political Subdivisions, 9 INSIGHTS 19 (1995); Dennis L. Holsapple & Curtis L. Christensen,
SEC Rule 15c2-12 and Ongoing Disclosure Obligations of Obligors of Municipal Securities, 17
URB. LAW. 951 (1995).
206. See id.
207. See supra note 204.
208. See supra note 28.
209. See Backman, 910 F.2d 10. The material events disclosure requirement “should not be
misconstrued .  . . as requiring the timely disclosure of all material information.” Fippinger,
supra note 56, at 21.
210. See Doty, supra note 154, at 42.
211. Typically municipal issuers cannot remain silent. See Holsapple & Christensen , supra
note 64, at 950-51 (discussing the typical release of information by press release and public
statements). See also Fippinger, supra note 56, at 19. Silence is, of course, inconsistent with the
issuer incentives toward disclosure. See supra notes 96-145 and accompanying text (discussing
incentives for disclosure).
212. See generally id.
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2. Failure to Provide Ongoing Disclosure
Rule 15c2-12 does not require SEC filings. 213 Instead, issuers file
the required disclosure documents with national and state repositories
and the MSRB.214 The purpose of the repositories is to make
information more accessible to investors. However, in addition to
evidence that investors may be no better off within the scheme
imposed by Rule 15c2-12, 215 the scheme imposes a potentially time
consuming and costly multiple reporting duty upon issuers.
More importantly, Rule 15c2-12’s failure to provide an
enforcement mechanism and the absence of reported Rule 15c2-12
cases may tempt issuers to ignore the ongoing disclosure
requirements. The potential liability, however, remains. The SEC
encourages the parties involved to specify remedies for
noncompliance in their agreement. 216 The extent to which parties so
agree is unknown.
Absent an agreement between the parties, the potential liability for
noncompliance is unclear. 217 The questions follow: Who has liability
for noncompliance? Is liability imposed for all misstatements,
negligent misstatements or only intentional misstatements? To whose
benefit does such liability accrue? Is there a private cause of action
for violation?
As noted earlier, the SEC does not have the resources to
investigate all violations of Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments. Thus,
the underwriters and the broker/dealer community must assume the
burden of policing the municipal market with respect to initial and
ongoing disclosure under Rule 15c2-12 and its amendments. With
thousands of municipal issues sold and accompanied by
nonstandardized official statements, this is an onerous task for the
investment community, especially with respect to the small issuers
213. See generally supra note 42.
214. Rule 15c2-12(b)(5)( i)(A).
215. See Fairchild & Ellis, supra note 7. The regulatory scheme created by Rule 15c2-12,
as opposed to the SEC’s role as the central repository for information regarding corporate
securities, imposes increased costs on investors because of the time needed to search multiple
sources to obtain information.
216. See 1994 Release, supra note 56, at 59, 601-02.
217. See generally id.
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with little financial history.
To deal with this task, the investment community can, and does,
require issuer officials to sign Rule 10b-5 certificates. 218 By signing
these anti-fraud certificates, the issuer affirms that the disclosure
documents contain no misstatements or misleading statements.
Hence, finance professionals shift the responsibility of verifying the
accuracy and completeness of disclosure documents to the issuer and
its officials.219
Once more, potential liability is unclear. In an attempt to avoid
liability, finance professionals require issuers to sign 10b-5
certificates.220 Presumably, misstatements or misleading disclosures
could then subject the issuer to liability from investors who
purchased or sold the bonds. 221 The nature of this liability, however,
is unclear, as Rule 15c2-12 specifies no liability for
noncompliance. 222
The importance of private cause of action has been previously
recognized. 223 In the corporate securities market, a private cause of
action for misleading statements arises under section 11, 224 which
also provides a laundry list of defendants. 225 Potential plaintiffs
include any purchaser or seller of the security. 226 Section 11 provides
no scienter requirement, but instead imposes strict liability. Rule
15c2-12 provides no such liability; 227 however, it is possible that a
private cause of action exists under Rule 15c2-12 against municipal
218. See Doty, supra note 154, at 45.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., Gellis, supra note 26, at 83-86 (discussing relative merits of administrative
enforcement and a private cause of action in the municipal securities market).
224. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. If liability in the municipal securities
market was imposed on the municipal issuer based on the corporate security model, this would
ultimately impose liability on the municipal taxpayer. See Gellis , supra note 26, at 109-112
(discussing the fairness of imposing liability on the “innocent taxpayer” and whether the
differences between taxpayers and shareholders justify different treatment). See also Doty,
supra note 154 (discussing enforcement and implication of imposing liability on the issuer, and
issuer officials).
226. See generally supra note 149.
227. See Gellis , supra note 26, at 108-18 (proposing enforcement in the municipal market
modeled on the corporate securities scheme).
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bond issuers.228 Furthermore, even if a private cause of action exists,
it is unclear who the potential defendants are, and whether the
liability is subject to limitations. 229 Rule 15c2-12 does not preclude
Rule 10b-5, so a private individual can bring a cause of action under
10b-5 for violations in the municipal securities market. 230 The
uncertain interaction between 10b-5 liability and the obligations
imposed by Rule 15c2-12, however, only complicate the questions
posed.
D. Conclusion on the Possible Pitfalls
Rule 15c2-12 increases the liability exposure for municipal issuers
and issuer officials. As such, issuers and issuer officials must become
more proactive with respect to the preparation of disclosure
documents in both the primary and secondary markets. Essentially,
issuer officials must have knowledge of securities law and their
disclosure responsibilities under those laws, if they want to ensure
that they do not become entrapped by the potential pitfalls. In
addition, officials should carefully document the investigative
process used to verify the accuracy of their disclosure information,
including detailed documentation of expert opinions, analyses, and
reports. A detailed “paper trail” increases the probability of
establishing an issuer’s innocence should an accusation arise
regarding its disclosure information. Moreover, if misstatements or
misleading disclosures result from an analysis or opinion of an expert
employed by the issuer, then the issuer may have legal recourse
against the expert. 231
IV. REGULATORY REFORM
Rule 15c2-12 is an indirect attempt by the SEC to regulate the
municipal bond market. As noted above, the Rule and its
amendments create potential liability pitfalls for issuers and issuer
228. See id.
229. See Doty, supra note 154, at 47-48. Doty emphasizes the potential for liability for
noncompliance with Rule 15c2-12. He discusses primarily Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a).
230. See id.
231. See Doty, supra note 154, at 46, 49.
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officials. These pitfalls stem from the limitations placed on the SEC
and the MSRB by the Tower Amendment. 232 This amendment is the
primary obstruction to achieving an effective disclosure environment
for both issuers and investors in the municipal market. 233
Although the Tower Amendment is largely responsible for the
existing regulatory framework, investors and issuers face a
substantially different municipal securities market today than in
1975. Through the rapid growth of the derivatives markets, municipal
bonds have evolved into more complex instruments. In many cases,
they are identical to corporate bonds, except for the tax-exempt
interest income. This complexity is of particular concern to issuers
because issuers must have a thorough understanding of the
derivatives they embed in their securities. 234
Two initial steps should be taken to reform the regulatory
environment of the municipal bond market. 235 First, Congress should
repeal the Tower Amendment. Repealing this amendment will permit
the much needed direct regulation of the municipal market at the
federal level and benefit both issuers and investors, because the SEC
will be able to mandate consistent regulations. Second, Congress
should endow one federal entity with both rulemaking and direct
enforcement power over  all participants in the municipal market,
including issuers, which will ensure consistent enforcement of the
regulations.
The current regulatory framework is fragmented. Rulemaking
authority rests with the MSRB while the SEC, NASD, and bank
regulators each have enforcement powers. 236 The MSRB’s inability to
enforce its rules hinders its ability to develop expertise determining
compliance with the rules and creates a potential disparate
enforcement of MSRB rules, depending upon whether the dealer is a
232. See supra note 52.
233. See generally id.
234. Derivatives are also a concern for issuers who invest excess funds in such securities.
The Orange County, California bankruptcy highlights the financial perils resulting from
investment in derivative securities. See generally Doty, supra note 154.
235. We are not the first to urge reform of the municipal securities regulatory framework.
See, e.g., Gellis, supra note 26 (arguing for a system of federally mandated disclosure rules);
Fairchild & Ellis, supra note 7; Gellis, supra note 1.
236. See infra note 237.
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bank or non-bank entity. 237 Ultimately, this means investors and
issuers receive varying degrees of protection and are subject to each
particular regulator’s interpretation of the rules and enforcement
policies.
Our proposed reform recommends eliminating the MSRB and
giving the SEC regulatory jurisdiction over the municipal market in a
manner identical to its powers over the corporate markets. 238 We
believe that the limited differences between municipal bonds and
corporate bonds in today’s market do not justify the different
regulatory treatment that has evolved.
Furthermore, the SEC has a great deal of expertise in the
corporate securities market which enable it to best regulate the
municipal market. Because the SEC is familiar with the corporate
market, it can recognize the limited differences between corporate
and municipal securities and, therefore, can tailor the disclosure rules
to the municipal securities market. 239 Presumably, the SEC would
consider a system to review proposed disclosures prior to issuance, 240
and specify liability for misleading disclosures. 241 Liability must be
more precisely defined so that issuers are not subject to risk-shifting
237. Bank municipal securities dealers are governed by the bank regulators. Non-bank
municipal securities dealers and brokers are subject to the enforcement authority of the SEC
and NASD. See 1993 STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
238. We considered, but rejected, the alternative of giving the MSRB enforcement powers
over all municipal issuers, municipal dealers and brokers. Arguably, the rulemaking ability of
the MSRB would be strengthened if it had both rulemaking and enforcement powers. The
primary reason the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 effectively
made the corporate markets safer was that the SEC has both rulemaking and enforcement
powers. 1993 STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, app. A at. 4. Currently, the MSRB does not conduct
investigations of dealer compliance with its rules. Which would provide useful information
regarding the operational aspects of its rules and their efficacy. Consistent enforcement
standards would likely result. However, granting the MSRB had enforcement powers would be
a duplicate investigations to compliance with the rules, because the SEC has a great deal of
expertise in this area and already performs this function in the corporate securities markets. The
MSRB’s performance of this task in the municipal market would not be an optimal use of
resources. More importantly, the composition of the MSRB Board could lead to biased
decisions that would limit the liability of underwriters and result in continued inadequate
disclosure.
239. For example, the SEC can address the large number of small issues in the municip al
market and the segmentation of the market between general obligation and revenue bonds. See
Gellis , supra note 26, at 76 (discussing differences as rationale for retaining §  3(a) exemption).
240. See id. at 79-97 (discussing advantages of such a system).
241. See id. at 109-18 (discussing benefits of imposing liability in municipal securities
market as in corporate market).
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by underwriters and other finance professionals.
Although issuers and industry groups oppose increased disclosure
requirements, 242 issuers will benefit from our proposed reform. Some
benefits are tangible. For example, the additional information
provided by disclosure reduces investor uncertainty. 243 The reduced
uncertainty translates into a significant reduction in net interest costs
for issuers.244 Other benefits are intangible and stem from issuers
potential reductions in exposure to the liability which currently
results from the pitfalls created by the existing disclosure
requirements.
Although some finance professionals (i.e., underwriters, financial
advisors, bond counsel) claim that standardized disclosure
requirements would increase disclosure costs for municipal issuers, 245
we argue otherwise. Many of these finance professionals already
routinely participate in corporate securities offerings. A similar
disclosure process for municipal issues would not require
professionals to learn a new set of disclosure requirements. The likely
scenario is that finance professionals may have more difficulty in
getting issuers to accept total responsibility for the accuracy and
completeness of the disclosure documents. Hence, standardized
disclosure requirements may mean increased liability exposure for
finance professionals, with a concurrent reduction in liability
exposure for issuers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Issuers of municipal securities, like our hypothetical town of
Springfield, face a highly fragmented regulatory environment. Each
state determines whether they must disclose any information to
investors prior to the issue, and if so, what type of information is
required. At the federal level, municipal issuers need not comply with
the SEC registration and reporting requirements imposed on
242. See Vicky Stamas, Advisory Firms Warn of Higher Fees as Disclosure Rules are
Tightened, BOND BUYER, July 13, 1989, at 1.
243. See generally, Lisa M. Fairchild,  Disclosure, Default Rates and Uncertainty in
Municipal Bond Markets, 18 MUN. FIN. J. 77-84 (1997).
244. See generally, Fairchild & Koch, supra note 14.
245. See generally Stamas, supra note 242.
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corporations. The SEC disclosure rules for municipal securities are
“passive” because they require little more than voluntary disclosure.
This passive system of disclosure is suboptimal for issuers. Because
the current regulatory system is not optimal for issuers or investors,
reform is necessary. Our recommendation is replacement of the
existing system with a more standardized process similar to that
required in the corporate securities market.
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